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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States today, roughly 36 percent of adults twenty
years or older are obese, and 6.3 percent are considered extremely
obese.1 Since 1960, the number of adults who are obese has doub-
led.2 An estimated 300,000 deaths annually are linked to obesity,3
and the medical cost associated with treating obesity and its related
diseases is a staggering $147 billion per year.4 Obesity is now con-
sidered an epidemic, and unlike smoking, the nation’s leading cause
of preventable death,5 the number of obese citizens is rising.6 
Government has responded to this crisis in a variety of ways.
Congress proposed bills such as the Healthy Lifestyles and
Prevention America Act,7 the Fit for Life Act,8 and the Healthy
Foods for Healthy Living Act.9 Several states passed bans on the
1. CHERYL D. FRYAR, MARGARET D. CARROLL & CYNTHIA L. OGDEN, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, PREVALENCE OF OVERWEIGHT, OBESITY, AND EXTREME OBESITY
AMONG ADULTS: UNITED STATES, TRENDS 1960-1962 THROUGH 2007-2008, at 1 (2012). 
2. Id. 
3. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL,
OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY: HEALTH CONSEQUENCES (2001), http://www.surgeongeneral.
gov/library/calls/obesity/factsheet03.pdf.
4. Overweight and Obesity: Causes and Consequences, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/causes/index.html (last updated Apr. 27,
2012). 
5. Tobacco Use: Evidence-Based Interventions for Your Community, COMMUNITY GUIDE,
www.thecommunityguide.org/about/What-Works-Tobacco-fact-sheet.pdf (last updated Mar.
2012); see also Phyllis Nichols et al., The Evolution of the Steps Program, 2003-2010:
Transforming the Federal Public Health Practice of Chronic Disease Prevention, 9 PREVENTING
CHRONIC DISEASE, Feb. 2, 2012, http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/ 2012/11_0220.htm. 
6. Stuart P. Weisberg, Note, Societal Change to Prevent Obesity, 288 JAMA 2176, 2176
(2002).
7. Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention America Act, S. 174, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing
a myriad of health- and obesity-related provisions such as promoting access to local foods in
schools, providing tax credits to employers who provide their employees with wellness
programs, and proposing guidelines for sodium content in certain foods). 
8. Fit for Life Act of 2011, H.R. 2795, 112th Cong. (proposing health and wellness
promotion through increased access to supermarkets in underserved communities and by
expanding fresh fruit and vegetable programs in schools). 
9. Healthy Foods for Healthy Living Act, H.R. 3291, 112th Cong. (2011) (allowing the
Secretary of Agriculture to provide grants to agencies that operate in low-income areas and
promote access to fresh fruits, vegetables, and other healthy food). 
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sale of junk food and soda in public schools.10 Washington, D.C.
recently enacted the Healthy Schools Act, a sweeping piece of legis-
lation aimed at improving the quality of food served in public
schools, encouraging physical activity, and promoting nutrition edu-
cation.11 Likewise, various executive agencies recently developed
programs aimed at curbing the obesity epidemic. The Centers for
Disease Control established the Division of Nutrition, Physical
Activity and Obesity.12 The U.S. Department of Agriculture began
its “Eat Smart. Play Hard.” campaign,13 and perhaps most famously,
First Lady Michele Obama created the “Lets Move!” initiative.14
Paralleling the proliferation of legislative and executive responses
to the obesity epidemic are “obesity lawsuits,” in which the plaintiffs
allege that food producers and restaurants are responsible for
making them overweight and unhealthy.15 Courts tend to be skep-
tical of such obesity suits,16 and Congress famously responded to
such litigation with the American Personal Responsibility in Food
Consumption Act, also known as the “Cheeseburger Bill.”17 
Perhaps in response to the failure of private-party litigation,
health and nutrition advocates have urged state attorneys general
10. See, e.g., Pupil Nutrition, Health, and Achievement Act of 2001, CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 49431.1-.2, .5 (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 223 (West 2011). 
11. Healthy Schools Act of 2010, D.C. CODE §§ 38.821.01 to .828.02 (2011). 
12. See Division of Nutrition, Physical Activity, and Obesity: About Us, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/DNPAO/aboutus/index.html
(last updated Dec. 20, 2012). 
13. About Eat Smart. Play Hard., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.fns.usda.gov/
eatsmartplayhardhealthylifestyle/about.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
14. See Learn the Facts, LET’S MOVE!, http://www.letsmove.gov/learn-facts/epidemic-
childhood-obesity (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
15. Brooke Courtney, Is Obesity Really the Next Tobacco? Lessons Learned from Tobacco
for Obesity Litigation, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 61, 63-64 (2006). Perhaps the most well known
of these obesity lawsuits is Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., in which plaintiffs argued that
McDonald’s deceptive practices about its unhealthy food caused the restaurant’s patrons to
become obese. 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Courtney, supra, at 73-74.
16. See, e.g., David Burnett, Fast-Food Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill: Critiquing
Congress’s Response to the Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 357, 377-80 (2007); Ben
Falit, Fast Food Fighters Fall Flat: Plaintiffs Fail to Establish that McDonalds Should Be
Liable for Obesity-Related Illnesses, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 725, 725 (2003). 
17. See Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (2005);
Burnett, supra note 16, at 387. Nearly twenty other states have passed similar legislation.
See ‘Cheeseburger Bill’ Puts Bite on Lawsuits, CNN (Oct. 20, 2005), http://articles.cnn.
com/2005-10-20/politics/cheeseburger.bill_1_cheeseburger-bill-fast-food-chains-food-
industry?_s=PM:POLITICS. 
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to sue the food industry under their parens patriae authority.18
Under the common law doctrine of parens patriae, a state attorney
general may bring an action against a party that has harmed the
health or economic well being of the citizens of the attorney gen-
eral’s state.19 Proponents of attorney general-initiated parens
patriae obesity suits look to the tobacco litigation of the mid-1990s
as a template for such obesity litigation.20 In the tobacco cases, state
attorneys general sued the tobacco industry under their parens
patriae authority to recover funds spent by their states in connec-
tion with treating smoking-related illnesses.21 The lawsuits resulted
in one of the largest civil settlements in United States history,22 in
which the tobacco industry agreed to pay the intervening states
nearly $10 billion per year for an indefinite period of time.23 Because
the tobacco lawsuits settled, however, the legal theories underlying
the litigation went untested.24 Thus, one should not presume that
tobacco litigation would provide an adequate template for state-
initiated obesity lawsuits.
Nonetheless, some advocates for attorney general-led obesity liti-
gation argue that states could pursue a similar strategy in obesity
litigation and sue the food industry to recoup money states spend on
treating their citizens’ obesity-related illnesses.25 This Note, how-
ever, contends that such an argument overlooks critical limitations
of the parens patriae doctrine. This Note will address these limi-
tations and explain why proponents of state-initiated obesity
litigation should not expect to rely on the tobacco litigation as a
template for their suits. In doing so, this Note will ultimately argue
18. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Kelly D. Brownell, Advancing Public Health Obesity
Policy Through State Attorneys General, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 425, 426-27 (2011) (noting
that attorneys general have the power to use parens patriae and that it may form a proper
basis for litigation).
19. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, State’s Standing to Sue on Behalf of Its Citizens,
42 A.L.R. FED. 23, § 2a, at 27-28 (1979).
20. See Pomeranz & Brownell, supra note 18, at 427. 
21. Id.
22. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-851, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: STATES’ USE OF
MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PAYMENTS 3 (2001).
23. Jess Alderman & Richard Daynard, Applying Lessons from Tobacco Litigation to
Obesity Suits, 30 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 82, 83 (2006).
24. Pomeranz & Brownell, supra note 18, at 427.
25. See id. 
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that state attorneys general will likely not have standing under
parens patriae for obesity litigation. 
Part I of this Note discusses the origins of parens patriae and how
state attorneys general relied upon this doctrine in tobacco litiga-
tion. Part II.A of this Note suggests that, unlike tobacco litigation,
there is no adequate causal link between the conduct of the food
industry and the obesity-related costs ultimately incurred by states
to justify standing under parens patriae. Part II.B of this Note pro-
poses that any action against the food industry under parens patriae
would violate the doctrine’s geographic limitations. A state may only
bring an action under parens patriae for harms that its citizens
experience that are causally connected to their citizenship in that
intervening state, and no such connection would exist in obesity
litigation. Part II.C of this Note argues that the underlying tort
upon which state attorneys general based their tobacco suits, public
nuisance, is not an adequate tort for parens patriae obesity liti-
gation. Taken together, these factors suggest that state attorneys
general will not be able to bring obesity suits under their parens
patriae powers.26 
26. Other scholars have researched the viability of parens patriae standing within the
context of obesity litigation. Such research, however, has been confined to a narrow
application of parens patriae actions—namely, when the state must intervene on behalf of a
minor because that minor’s parent or legal guardian has failed to provide adequate care for
that child. See, e.g., Shireen Arani, State Intervention in Cases of Obesity-Related Medical
Neglect, 82 B.U. L. REV. 875, 875-76 (2002); Edieth Y. Wu, McFat—Obesity, Parens Patriae,
and the Children, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 569, 569, 571-79 (2004); Elizabeth J. Sher, Note,
Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the State,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 157-60 (1983). These scholars have argued that the state must
intervene when the food industry harms minors by supplying them with unhealthy food and
the parents of those children do not prevent them from eating such food. Wu, supra, at 577.
Indeed, it is well-settled law that a state is allowed to intervene in order to protect a child’s
mental and physical health, and this issue often arises in cases of medical neglect. Arani,
supra, at 875-76. Because obesity is a medical condition, it seems likely that a state would
have the legal authority to intervene in cases of obesity-related medical neglect of minors. Id.
at 887. As mentioned below, one of the traditional formulations of the doctrine of parens
patriae was to provide a state, originally the king, legal authority to intervene on behalf of
minors who could not otherwise protect themselves. See infra text accompanying notes 27-30.
Thus, it is likely that such intervention by the state comports with the current doctrinal
boundaries of parens patriae.
This Note, unlike the aforementioned analyses, however, focuses not on state intervention
under parens patriae for the benefit of minors but rather on state-initiated litigation for the
purpose of vindicating its quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well being of all of its
citizens. Thus, state standing under parens patriae for the purposes of this Note focuses on
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  I. HISTORY OF PARENS PATRIAE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE   
MODERN DOCTRINE
Parens patriae, which translates to “parent of the country,”27 is a
common law doctrine originating in England that, at its inception,
allowed the king to assume a general guardian role over his sub-
jects.28 Initially the Crown used this legal theory to protect minors
and incompetents, but parens patriae later evolved into a “sweeping
common-law theory of Prerogative Regis” whereby the king had
broad authority to regulate and control “almost everything” that
happened within his jurisdiction.29 American courts slowly adopted
parens patriae, and over time it evolved into a catchall cause of
action that lacked clear doctrinal parameters.30 One scholar noted
that the expansion of parens patriae occurred “incrementally and
almost stealthily,”31 and that the body of law was, for a time, a
“precedential miasma.”32 Thus, for much of its history as part of
American jurisprudence, the boundaries and appropriate uses of
parens patriae have been poorly defined. 
A. Modern American Doctrine of Parens Patriae
The Supreme Court established the parameters of the current
formulation of parens patriae in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico.33 In Snapp, Puerto Rico asserted claims against
Virginian orchardists for refusing to hire Puerto Rican workers in
violation of a federal statute.34 Puerto Rico alleged that such a
refusal amounted to economic discrimination that harmed the
Puerto Rican economy and thereby granted Puerto Rico standing
state-initiated obesity litigation with an essentially regulatory purpose, not state intervention
for the purpose of acting as a de facto guardian of a minor.
27. See Pomeranz & Brownell, supra note 18, at 426. 
28. See Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1850 (2000). 
29. Id.
30. See id. at 1850-52.
31. Id. at 1850.
32. Id. at 1852. 
33. 458 U.S. 592, 607-08 (1982).
34. Id. at 597-98. 
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under parens patriae.35 Responding to this claim, the Court defined
the elements necessary to maintain standing under parens patriae:
[A] State must articulate an interest apart from the interests of
particular private parties, [that is], the State must be more than
a nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign
interest ... [such as its] interest in the health and well-be-
ing—both physical and economic—of its residents in general.... 
... Although more must be alleged than injury to an identifi-
able group of individual residents, the indirect effects of that
injury must be considered as well in determining whether the
State has alleged injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of
its population.... 
... [T]he State has an interest in securing observance of the
terms under which it participates in the federal system. In the
context of parens patriae actions, this means ensuring that the
State and its residents are not excluded from the benefits that
are to flow from participation in the federal system.36
 
Although the Court refrained from defining precisely what consti-
tutes a quasi-sovereign interest, and instead held that this was to
be determined on a “case-by-case” basis,37 a general rule emerged.
The rule recognizes that states have certain quasi-sovereign inter-
ests and, under some circumstances, they will have standing to
intervene under their parens patriae authority to vindicate those
interests.38 A state will not, however, have standing under parens
patriae when intervening as a nominal party to protect its propri-
etary or private interests.39 Thus, on its face, the parens patriae
doctrine, as the Court defined it in Snapp, seems to grant state
attorneys general broad authority so long as a state can articulate
a sufficient sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest. There are, how-
ever, other doctrinal limits to parens patriae that the Court did not
35. See id. at 594.
36. Id. at 607-08. 
37. Id. at 607.
38. Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco
Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1866-67 (2000).
39. Id. at 1865. 
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address in Snapp. These limits, as applied to obesity litigation, are
the focus of this Note.40
B. Parens Patriae and Tobacco Litigation 
Tobacco litigation seemed to fit neatly within the general para-
meters of a valid parens patriae action.41 The intervening states
were not nominal parties to the litigation because of the expenses
they incurred in treating tobacco-related illnesses.42 Moreover, the
intervening states had a valid quasi-sovereign interest in the health
and welfare of their citizens and, therefore, under the Snapp factors,
they had standing to pursue their claims under parens patriae.43
Finally, even if the aforementioned factors were satisfied, as with all
causes of action, there must have been some breach of a legal duty
in order to have standing under parens patriae.44 In order to meet
this requirement, states that were party to the tobacco litigation
relied upon the tort of public nuisance.45 
As this Note discusses below, public nuisance cannot be as easily
applied to state-sponsored obesity litigation. The deficiencies unique
to parens patriae obesity suits—diffuse causation, lack of a geo-
graphic connection between the harms experienced by citizens and
their citizenship in the intervening state, and reliance on the tort of
public nuisance—become particularly apparent when compared to
the tobacco litigation. The result is that state attorneys general
40. See infra Part II.A-C. This Note does not focus on whether obesity litigation satisfies
the Snapp factors. Instead, this Note focuses primarily on other long-standing doctrinal limits
of parens patriae that were not explicitly addressed in Snapp. Snapp is mentioned not as a
way to frame the arguments contained herein but rather as an introduction to the modern
doctrine of parens patriae.
41. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1866. 
42. See id. at 1865-66; see also Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Parens Patriae
Litigation to Redress Societal Damages from the BP Oil Spill: The Latest Stage in the
Evolution of Crimtorts, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 87 (2011) (noting that states can
bring a suit under parens patriae if “the state’s interest is independent of the rights of private
parties”).
43. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1865-66.
44. See id. at 1883 (“[T]here remains the requirement that defendants breach some legal
duty that harms a state’s parens patriae interest. Parens patriae doctrine helps articulate the
state’s legal interests. It does not define the defendant’s legal duties.”).
45. See Lauren E. Handler & Charles E. Erway III, Tort of Public Nuisance in Public
Entity Litigation: Return to the Jungle?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 484, 487 (2002). 
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likely will not have the authority under their parens patriae powers
to bring obesity suits against the food industry. 
II. INADEQUACIES OF PARENS PATRIAE AS A STRATEGY FOR OBESITY
LITIGATION
A. Deficient Causation
Perhaps the most onerous obstacle that parens patriae obesity
suits face is establishing causation between the conduct of various
members of the food industry and obesity-related health problems.46
Many of the seminal parens patriae cases arose from conduct that
was directly connected to the harms that were the basis for such
suits.47 The same cannot be said for parens patriae obesity suits.
The lack of such a direct causal connection will likely diminish a
state’s ability to have standing under parens patriae for obesity
litigation. 
1. Strong Causation in Early and Modern Parens Patriae
Jurisprudence 
Many of the foundational parens patriae cases suggest that the
causal connection between the conduct of the food industry and the
obesity epidemic may be too attenuated for states to maintain
standing under parens patriae. For example, in Louisiana v. Texas,
a case that helped lay the groundwork for the modern American
version of parens patriae,48 Louisiana alleged that various quaran-
tine regulations imposed by the Governor of Texas were directly
aimed at harming the businesses and overall economy of
Louisiana.49 In particular, Louisiana argued that the quarantine
regulations were specifically designed to boost the shipping industry
of Galveston, Texas at the expense of the economy of New Orleans.50
Although the Court ultimately dismissed the complaint on other
46. See Alderman & Daynard, supra note 23, at 85 (“[C]ausation issues in food litigation
are more complicated than those in tobacco cases.”). 
47. See infra Part II.A.1.
48. Ratliff, supra note 28, at 1851. 
49. 176 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1900). 
50. Id. at 8. 
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grounds, it affirmed that Louisiana had standing under parens
patriae to vindicate these kinds of direct, economic harms.51 
Likewise, in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., Georgia
alleged that various railroad companies fixed their rates for the
shipment of goods through Georgia to favor the ports of other
states.52 The effect of such rate fixing was “to deny to many of
Georgia’s products equal access with those of other States to the
national market ... [and] to hold the Georgia economy in a state of
arrested development.”53 The Court noted that Georgia’s interest in
this case was “not remote,” but rather was “immediate” and af-
firmed that Georgia had standing under parens patriae because of
the economic harm caused by the rate fixing.54 
More recent case law further suggests that the conduct of the food
industry may be too remote from the obesity epidemic for a state to
have parens patriae standing. For example, South Carolina v. North
Carolina arose over a dispute regarding the apportionment of the
Catawba River watershed.55 South Carolina opposed the division of
the watershed and had standing to do so under its parens patriae
authority.56 The Court noted that “a State’s sovereign interest in
ensuring an equitable share of an interstate river’s water is pre-
cisely the type of interest that the State, as parens patriae, repre-
sents.”57 Thus, the harm to the environment and people of South
Carolina that would result from the proposed division of the
watershed was direct and clear enough to allow South Carolina
parens patriae standing.58 
In contrast, parties have been denied parens patriae standing in
products liability actions because the harms underlying such suits
51. See id. at 19 (“It is in this aspect that the bill before us is framed. Its gravamen is not
a special and peculiar injury such as would sustain an action by a private person, but the
State of Louisiana presents herself in the attitude of parens patriae, trustee, guardian, or
representative of all her citizens.... [T]he State is entitled to seek relief in this way because
the matters complained of affect her citizens at large.”).
52. 324 U.S. 439, 444-45 (1945).
53. Id. at 444. 
54. See id. at 447, 450-51. 
55. 130 S. Ct. 854, 858 (2010). 
56. Id. at 867-68. 
57. Id. at 867.
58. Id.
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were too remote from the defendants’ conduct.59 For example, in
Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., the city of Bridgeport, Connecticut
sued various handgun manufacturers, alleging that the production
and distribution of handguns caused the city to suffer “irreparable
harm and financial harm, including additional expenses for police
services, emergency services, and expenses for pension benefits,
health care, social services and necessary facilities.”60 The court
reached its conclusion that Bridgeport lacked parens patriae
standing by focusing on the attenuated chain of causation between
the defendants’ conduct and the harm underlying the suit.61 The
court noted that the attenuated chain of causation consisted of the
following links:
The manufacturers sell the handguns to distributors or whole-
salers .... The distributors then sell the handguns to the retailers
.... [T]he retailer then sells the guns either to authorized buyers,
namely, legitimate consumers, or, through the “straw man”
method or other illegitimate means, to unauthorized buyers ....
Next, the illegally acquired guns enter an “illegal market.” From
that market, those guns end up in the hands of unauthorized
users. Next, either the unauthorized buyers misuse the guns by
not taking proper storage precautions or other unwarned or
uninstructed precautions, or the unauthorized buyers misuse
the guns to commit crimes or other harmful acts. Depending on
the nature of the conduct of the users of the guns, the plaintiffs
then incur expenses for such municipal necessities as investiga-
tion of crime, emergency and medical services for the injured, or
similar expenses. Finally, as a result of this chain of events, the
plaintiffs ultimately suffer the harms delineated previously,
namely, increased costs for various municipal services.62
Unlike the intervening states in Louisiana v. Texas, Georgia v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., and South Carolina v. North Carolina,
the city of Bridgeport was unable to show a sufficiently direct causal
59. See Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and
Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 935 (2008). 
60. 780 A.2d 98, 109 (Conn. 2001); see also Gifford, supra note 59, at 935. 
61. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 129 (“[T]he plaintiffs lack standing because the harms they claim
are too remote from the defendants’ misconduct, and are too derivative of the injuries of
others.”). 
62. Id. at 123. 
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connection between the harm that served as the basis for its suit
and the ultimate economic consequences.63 The number of steps in
the chain of causation is what distinguishes Ganim from the
aforementioned cases. In Louisiana v. Texas, Texas’s quarantine
regulations prohibited the shipment of all goods from New Orleans
into Texas.64 Such action had a direct and easily discernible effect
on the shipping industry of New Orleans and the economy of
Louisiana in general.65 Likewise, the rate-fixing practices at issue
in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. had an obvious adverse
impact on the economy of Georgia by restricting the state’s ability
to ship its goods throughout the nation.66 In contrast, the conduct of
the defendants in Ganim may have had some link to the harms
ultimately suffered by the plaintiffs, but the connection was so
attenuated that the State could not maintain standing under parens
patriae.67
The costs incurred by states in treating the obesity epidemic are
likely more akin to the kinds of harms complained of in Ganim than
those at issue in Louisiana v. Texas, Georgia v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., and South Carolina v. North Carolina.68 Much like the
financial harms suffered by the city of Bridgeport, the financial
obligations a state incurs as a result of obesity have a complex amal-
gam of causes, only one of which is food consumption.69 Although the
conduct of various members of the food industry may have had some
connection to the costs incurred by states in treating obesity, such
conduct is by no means the direct, predominant cause of the obesity
63. See id. at 123-24. 
64. 176 U.S. 1, 4 (1900). 
65. Id. at 8-9.
66. 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945) (“If the allegations of the bill are taken as true, the economy
of Georgia and the welfare of her citizens have seriously suffered as the result of this alleged
conspiracy. Discriminatory rates are but one form of trade barriers. They may cause a blight
no less serious than the spread of noxious gas over the land or the deposit of sewage in the
streams. They may affect the prosperity and welfare of a State as profoundly as any diversion
of waters from the rivers. They may stifle, impede, or cripple old industries and prevent the
establishment of new ones. They may arrest the development of a State or put it at a decided
disadvantage in competitive markets.”). 
67. See Ganim, 780 A.2d at 129-30; see also Gifford, supra note 59, at 935. 
68. Compare Ganim, 780 A.2d at 129-30, with South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S.
Ct. 854, 867 (2010), Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. at 444-45, and Louisiana, 176 U.S. at 7-9.
69. See infra Part II.A.3.
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epidemic.70 Thus, because a state’s claim in an obesity suit would be
based on a more attenuated, Ganim-like chain of causation, it is
unlikely that state attorneys general will have parens patriae
standing to pursue such claims.
2. Strong Causation in State-Initiated Tobacco Litigation 
To further illustrate the limitation that deficient causation would
place on parens patriae obesity litigation, it is useful to analyze
state-initiated tobacco litigation. In tobacco litigation, the conduct
of the defendants and the harms suffered by the citizens of the
intervening states had a clear and direct causal nexus. For example,
medical research has tied various health problems directly to the
use of cigarettes.71 It is generally well accepted that diseases like
emphysema and dysrhythmias are caused by long-term cigarette
use,72 and numerous surgeon general reports directly link causes of
certain cancers to smoking.73 Furthermore, tobacco consumption
trends and the business practices of tobacco defendants strength-
ened the causal connection in tobacco litigation.74 For example,
among cigarette users, loyalty to a particular brand of cigarettes
was quite common.75 In addition, many of the tobacco companies
deliberately concealed the dangers of smoking through deceptive
advertising practices.76 Most importantly, however, the five com-
panies and their subsidiaries that were defendants in the to-
bacco litigation, and ultimately parties to the Master Settlement
70. See, e.g., Courtney, supra note 15, at 96.
71. Joseph P. McMenamin & Andrea D. Tiglio, Not the Next Tobacco: Defenses to Obesity
Claims, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445, 446 (2006).
72. Richard A. Daynard et al., Food Litigation: Lessons from the Tobacco Wars, 288 JAMA
2179, 2179 (2002); McMenamin & Tiglio, supra note 71, at 446. 
73. Alderman & Daynard, supra note 23, at 82.
74. Courtney, supra note 15, at 82 (“[T]he most critical factors influencing high smoking
rates appear to be the addictive nature of cigarettes and intense tobacco industry marketing
and advertising.”).
75. Alderman & Daynard, supra note 23, at 85. 
76. Id. at 86 (“[T]he major tobacco companies had a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ not to
compete on safety and launched a massive disinformation campaign to deny the product’s
dangers.”); Courtney, supra note 15, at 95 (“[I]t is a well-documented and well-accepted belief
that tobacco companies have deceived the public about the addictiveness and the dangers of
using tobacco products.”); John F. Banzhaf III, Who Should Pay for Obesity?, S.F. DAILY J.,
Feb. 2, 2002.
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Agreement, together comprised nearly 100 percent of the tobacco
market in the United States.77 Taken together, these medical and
business-related factors helped establish a sufficiently direct causal
connection between the conduct of the tobacco industry and the
harms suffered by cigarette users.78 Without such a direct causal
connection, however, tobacco litigation likely would not have been
as successful. 
3. Causation Discrepancies Between Tobacco and Obesity 
Litigation
 Unlike the tobacco litigation, parens patriae obesity suits do not
have such an easily traceable chain of causation between the
conduct of the food industry and the obesity epidemic. Perhaps the
most formidable obstacle to establishing causation is that there are
many different environmental, lifestyle, and uncontrollable genetic
causes of obesity.79 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
states that “[t]here are a variety of factors that play a role in obe-
sity” and lists among these factors an individual’s balance of caloric
intake, environment, genetics, diseases, and drug use.80 Moreover,
technological advances that mechanize formerly human-powered
tasks can also contribute to obesity.81
Thus, unlike tobacco litigation, in which the harm caused by
smoking was directly related to cigarette use, the harm caused by
obesity derives from a much more diffuse combination of factors.82
77. See F.A. Sloan, C.A. Mathews & J.G. Trogdon, Impacts of the Master Settlement
Agreement on the Tobacco Industry, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 356, 356 (2004) (discussing which
cigarette companies were party to the Master Settlement Agreement); U.S. Tobacco Market
Share 1995, 2000, TOBACCO.ORG, http://archive.tobacco.org/Resources/mktshr.html (last
updated Apr. 5, 1996) (showing the market share of Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company, Brown & Williamson, Lorillard, and Liggett Group in 1994, 1995, and 2000); see
also Courtney, supra note 15, at 95 (“For the most part, the tobacco industry is an oligopoly.
With just a few major companies controlling most of the tobacco market, it is fairly easy to
point the finger at who is to blame for smoking-related conditions.”). 
78. Cf. Alderman & Daynard, supra note 23, at 83 (noting that plaintiffs found success in
the 1990s and won large punitive damages from defendant tobacco companies). 
79. See Burnett, supra note 16, at 381; Overweight and Obesity, supra note 4. 
80. See Overweight and Obesity, supra note 4.
81. Theodore H. Frank, A Taxonomy of Obesity Litigation, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
427, 438 (2006). 
82. See Courtney, supra note 15, at 96. 
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Because someone’s overall lifestyle contributes to obesity, and food
consumption is only one cause of obesity, establishing sufficient
causation between the conduct of the food industry and the obesity
epidemic may be an insurmountable hurdle for parens patriae
obesity suits.83 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that food consumption
is the only cause of obesity, there are still significant barriers to
establishing a viable chain of causation between the conduct of the
food industry and the obesity epidemic. For one, no food, if con-
sumed in moderation, is entirely harmful.84 Although restaurants
like McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger King sell food that is gen-
erally considered unhealthy, fast food alone “will not necessarily
cause obesity.”85 Thus, an argument for the inherent danger of cer-
tain food products would be flawed because all foods have some
beneficial nutritional value, “unlike tobacco which has no essential
physiological value.”86 Moreover, unlike studies of tobacco products,
there is conflicting research as to what foods are considered “good”
foods and what foods are “bad” foods.87 It is also entirely possible
that a food producer may sell a categorically “good” food product
that a consumer simply overeats.88 Even if the food industry alone
is responsible for the obesity epidemic—an assumption that is al-
most assuredly false given the myriad causes of obesity89—the
variables among food consumption patterns and food quality suggest
a tenuous causal nexus.90
The sheer number of food companies and food producers further
weakens the causal connection between the conduct of the food
industry and obesity. Unlike the tobacco industry, which was essen-
tially an “oligopoly,” the food industry has many different players,
“consisting of numerous manufacturers, restaurants, and retailers
of various sizes,” all of whom in some way may have contributed to
83. See MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION
AND HEALTH 361 (Darra Goldstein ed., 2002). 
84. See Burnett, supra note 16, at 381; Daynard et al., supra note 72, at 2179. 
85. See Burnett, supra note 16, at 381. 
86. Id. at 381-82.
87. See Alderman & Daynard, supra note 23, at 85; McMenamin & Tiglio, supra note 71,
at 457. 
88. Daynard et al., supra note 72, at 2179. 
89. See Overweight and Obesity, supra note 4.
90. See Alderman & Daynard, supra note 23, at 85. 
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the obesity epidemic.91 Moreover, not only are there many different
food producers, but there are more than 320,000 food items on the
market in the United States.92 
In addition, unlike the tobacco industry, there is scant evidence
that the food industry has deliberately tried to deceive consumers
about the adverse health effects of various food products.93 Often
food companies voluntarily disclose the ingredients of the food they
produce, and several fast-food restaurants publicize information
such as the trans fat content of their products.94 Notably, the court
in Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. found these factors compelling in
dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.95 The court reasoned that the
plaintiff should have no cause of action because, among other
things, he failed to allege “that the danger of the McDonalds’
products were [sic] not well-known,” and because “McDonalds’
products consumed by the plaintiffs were [not] dangerous in any
way other than that which was open and obvious to a reasonable
consumer.”96 Thus, greater transparency regarding the content and
quality of food certainly plays a crucial role in further weakening
causation between the food industry and the obesity epidemic. 
In sum, it appears that causation may be an insurmountable
hurdle for state-initiated obesity litigation. It is unlikely that caus-
ation in such suits would be as clear and direct as in most doctrinal
parens patriae cases, and it is nearly certain that causation in obe-
sity litigation would not be as easily established as it was in its
tobacco counterpart. However, even if causation does not bar obesity
litigation, these suits have other fatal deficiencies that are discussed
below.
B. Parens Patriae and Its Geographic Limitations
Historically for a state to have parens patriae standing, the harm
that justified intervention had to be in some way unique to that
91. Courtney, supra note 15, at 96 (“[T]he food industry is much more complex, ...
[making] it much more difficult to determine which product company is responsible for
obesity.”). 
92. NESTLE, supra note 83, at 361; Alderman & Daynard, supra note 23, at 86. 
93. Courtney, supra note 15, at 95 & n.244. 
94. Id.
95. 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 540-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
96. Id. at 539-41. 
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intervening state.97 Justice Holmes alluded to this geographic limi-
tation when he noted in his opinion in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co. that a state intervening under parens patriae does so because
it has “an interest independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”98
At first blush, his comment appears to apply only to causes of action
deriving from environmental harms. However, the principle under-
lying his observation—that the harm justifying intervention must
be unique to that intervening state—appears to be a well-settled
prerequisite for parens patriae standing. Indeed as one scholar has
noted, in most, if not all, of the seminal parens patriae cases, “the
harms suffered by the original victims were causally connected to
their residency within that particular [intervening] state.”99 No such
geographic connection would exist in obesity litigation.100
1. Economic Harms and the Geographic Limits of Parens
Patriae
There are many parens patriae cases in which the citizens of a
particular state suffered economic harm by virtue of their citizen-
ship in that intervening state.101 For example, in Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, the Supreme Court enjoined the enforcement of a
West Virginia act that would have cut off the supply of natural gas
from West Virginia to Pennsylvania and Ohio.102 The Court held
that the economic harms that would be suffered by the people of
Pennsylvania and Ohio, if enforcement of the act was not enjoined,
sufficiently justified Pennsylvania and Ohio’s intervention under
parens patriae.103 Similarly, in Minnesota v. Standard Oil Co., the
97. See Gifford, supra note 59, at 937. Many of the cases cited in Section II.B of this Note
were initially found in the American Law Reports overview article on the doctrine of parens
patriae. See generally Eclavea, supra note 19. 
98. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
99. Gifford, supra note 59, at 937.
100. See infra Part II.B.4.
101. Gifford, supra note 59, at 935-37.
102. 262 U.S. 553, 600 (1923).
103. Id. at 591 (“The attitude of the complainant States is not that of mere volunteers
attempting to vindicate the freedom of interstate commerce or to redress purely private
grievances. Each sues to protect a two-fold interest—one as the proprietor of various public
institutions and schools whose supply of gas will be largely curtailed or cut off by the
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court held that Minnesota could maintain a parens patriae action
against the defendant for allegedly overcharging Minnesota resi-
dents for oil purchases.104 The court reasoned that a state may act
under parens patriae whenever it has to vindicate a quasi-sovereign
interest, and protection of the economic welfare of its citizens was
such an interest.105 Likewise, in Snapp, the Court allowed Puerto
Rico standing under parens patriae because its citizens were
harmed by the Virginia orchardists’ preference to hire workers from
states other than Puerto Rico.106 As in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia
and Minnesota v. Standard Oil Co., the injuries sustained by Puerto
Rican workers were clearly a consequence of their citizenship of
Puerto Rico. The Puerto Rican workers who were discriminated
against would not have experienced such discrimination if they were
citizens of Virginia.107 Similarly, the Pennsylvanians and Ohioans
who would have been harmed by West Virginia cutting off the flow
of gas would not have experienced such harm if they were residents
of, say, Florida.108 In each of these cases, the economic injuries expe-
rienced by the citizens of intervening states had some causal
connection to their citizenship in those states.109
2. Environmental Harms and the Geographic Limits of Parens
Patriae
A similar geographic limitation is apparent in many environmen-
tal parens patriae cases.110 For example, in Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., the Court held that Georgia had standing under parens
patriae to enjoin the defendant from “discharging noxious gas from
threatened interference with the interstate current, and the other as the representative of the
consuming public whose supply will be similarly affected. Both interests are substantial and
both are threatened with serious injury.”).
104. 568 F. Supp. 556, 563 (D. Minn. 1983).
105. Id. (“[T]he parens patriae doctrine allows a state to maintain a legal action where state
citizens have been harmed, where the state maintains a quasi-sovereign interest.... Minnesota
has a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the economic health of its citizens.”). 
106. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 608 (1982). 
107. See id. at 597-98 & n.5.
108. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
109. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Can Governments Impose a New Tort Duty to Prevent
External Risks? The “No-Fault” Theories Behind Today’s High-Stakes Government
Recoupment Suits, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 923, 938 (2009).
110. See Gifford, supra note 59, at 937. 
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their works in Tennessee over the plaintiff ’s territory.”111 Similarly,
in Maine v. M/V Tamano, the court sustained Maine’s right to sue
under parens patriae for the defendant’s wrongful conduct that
resulted in 100,000 gallons of oil being spilled into a bay off of the
Maine coastline.112 Likewise, in South Carolina v. North Carolina,
the Supreme Court allowed South Carolina standing under parens
patriae to challenge North Carolina’s proposed diversion of certain
waters in a watershed shared by the two states.113 South Carolin-
ians were injured by North Carolina’s apportionment of their
watershed precisely because they lived in South Carolina. Likewise,
residents of Maine who were harmed by the oil dump in M/V
Tamano would not have suffered such harm if they lived in, say,
North Dakota. Like the aforementioned economic parens patriae
cases, the harms that justified state action in these environmental
cases were harms that citizens suffered as a consequence of their
citizenship in the intervening states.114 
3. Health-Related Harms and the Geographic Limits of Parens
Patriae
Health-related parens patriae cases also require the harm that
justifies state intervention to be unique to that particular state. In
Missouri v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that Missouri had
parens patriae standing to request an injunction against the dis-
charge of sewage into the Mississippi River by the sanitary district
of Chicago.115 The Court affirmed that when the health of the citi-
zens of a particular state is threatened, that state has standing
under parens patriae to seek an injunction against the harmful
behavior.116 Likewise, in New York v. New Jersey, the Supreme
111. 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907).
112. 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (D. Me. 1973) (“[The defendants’] assertion is essentially that
the State has no sufficiently independent interest in its coastal waters and their marine life
to permit it to sue as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens. The Court disagrees.”). 
113. 130 S. Ct. 854, 867-68 (2010) (“[A] State’s sovereign interest in ensuring an equitable
share of an interstate river’s water is precisely the type of interest that the State, as parens
patriae, represents on behalf of its citizens.”). 
114. See Schwartz et al., supra note 109, at 938. 
115. 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
116. Id. (“An inspection of the bill discloses that the nature of the injury complained of is
such that an adequate remedy can only be found in this court at the suit of the State of
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Court upheld New York’s standing under parens patriae to enjoin
New Jersey from dumping sewage into the New York Harbor
because of the adverse health effects that this practice had on the
citizens of New York.117 Thus, in the context of health-related
injuries, states can maintain standing under parens patriae to vin-
dicate the harms that their citizens experienced because of their
citizenship in that intervening state.118
4. Geographic Limits in Parens Patriae Obesity Litigation 
State-initiated obesity litigation is well outside of parens patriae’s
geographic limitations because the harms of the obesity epidemic
are not unique to any particular state. For example, a person’s resi-
dency in North Carolina as opposed to, say, Michigan does not
influence the likelihood of that person becoming obese.119 Assuming
that the market for food is nationwide, that certain states do not
have significantly greater access than other states to good foods, and
that there is a meaningful distinction between good and bad foods,120
a person’s residency in one state likely does not increase or decrease
that person’s chances of becoming obese.121 Notably, in the few cases
in which a State intervened under parens patriae explicitly to
vindicate harms done to the health of that state’s population, the
Missouri. It is true that no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct property rights
belonging to the complainant State. But it must surely be conceded that, if the health and
comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper party to represent
and defend them.”).
117. 256 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1921). The Court in this case did not explicitly say that New
York had standing to seek an injunction against New Jersey, but the implication of its holding
supports such a conclusion. Id. (“[T]he right of the State to maintain such a suit as is stated
in the bill is very clear. The health, comfort and prosperity of the people of the State ... being
gravely menaced, ... the State is the proper party to represent and defend such rights by resort
to the remedy of an original suit in this court.”). 
118. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1869 (“Justice Holmes’s reference to ‘health’
is made in a context that establishes health as an interest that a state may clearly defend
through parens patriae actions.”). 
119. See, e.g., Overweight and Obesity, supra note 4 (failing to list geography or a person’s
state of residence as a cause of obesity); cf. Gifford, supra note 59, at 937 (“[A]ssuming that
the marketplace for tobacco products is nationwide (a seemingly safe assumption), a victim’s
residence in Iowa neither increases nor decreases that victim’s risks of contracting a tobacco-
related illness. In other words, the victim’s residence in a state is unrelated to the harm
suffered.”). 
120. See supra text accompanying note 87. 
121. Cf. Gifford, supra note 59, at 937 (making the same analysis for tobacco cases). 
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harms experienced by the people of that intervening state were in
some way a consequence of their citizenship in that state.122 This,
however, would not be true for obesity litigation.
Admittedly, in some states a person’s chance of being obese may
be higher than in other states. For example, some states may have
greater access to fresh produce than others, or affluent states may
have more farmers’ markets and high-quality grocery stores than
poorer states.123 But, for the purposes of parens patriae analysis,
obesity is not an injury that a state’s citizens suffer uniquely be-
cause of their citizenship in that particular state. This is unlike, for
example, the health-related harms that the citizens of New York
experienced because of their citizenship in that state when New
Jersey dumped sewage in the New York harbor.124 In other words,
successful parens patriae actions derive from intentional conduct
that has a direct, adverse consequence on the citizens of the inter-
vening state. Lack of high-quality grocery stores or farmers’ markets
is not the result of intentional culpable conduct. Rather, it is the
result of the economic consequences of affluence or lack thereof. 
Thus, because there is no causal connection between a person’s
state citizenship and that person’s risk of becoming obese, state-
initiated obesity litigation would likely be beyond the scope of
parens patriae.125 If states can maintain standing under parens
patriae in their obesity suits, then any generalized harm that may
affect a sufficiently substantial portion of a state’s population would
provide state attorneys general with parens patriae standing. Such
an approach would markedly broaden the current parameters of
parens patriae and likely be an impermissible use of the doctrine.
5. Massachusetts v. EPA and the Geographic Limitations of
Parens Patriae
Critics of this view of the scope of parens patriae may point to the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Massachusetts v. EPA as support
for the contention that no such geographic limitation is imposed on
122. See supra Part II.B.3.
123. See Food Desert Locator: Overview, USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/
food-desert-locator.aspx (last updated Mar. 4, 2013).
124. See New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1921).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 82-90 (noting the causes of obesity).
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the doctrine.126 In that case, Massachusetts and other states sued
the Environmental Protection Agency for denying a rule-making
petition that would have reduced air pollution and, in theory, dimin-
ished the effects of global warming.127 The Supreme Court held that
Massachusetts and the other intervening states had standing to sue
under parens patriae.128 At first blush, this holding may seem to
eviscerate the apparent geographic limitation on parens patriae;
after all, the effects of global warming are ubiquitous and not
unique to any particular state.129 Indeed, as the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals noted in denying Massachusetts’s petition for review,
Emission of certain gases that the EPA is not regulating may
cause an increase in the temperature of the earth—a phenome-
non known as “global warming.” This is harmful to humanity at
large. Petitioners are or represent segments of humanity at
large. This would appear to me to be neither more nor less than
the sort of general harm eschewed as insufficient to make out an
Article III controversy.130
The Supreme Court, however, took a different view. The Court
began by noting that for a litigant to have standing it must “demon-
strate that it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury.”131
It then acknowledged that the risks of climate change were widely
felt and shared by many people, not just the citizens of Massachu-
setts.132 But the Court found that the harm Massachusetts experi-
enced was, in fact, unique to that state:
That these climate-change risks are “widely shared” does not
minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this litiga-
tion. According to petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits, global sea
levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the
20th century as a result of global warming. These rising seas
have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land.
126. See 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007); see also Gifford, supra note 59, at 937 n.179. 
127. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505, 510-11. 
128. Id. at 526.
129. See Gifford, supra note 59, at 937 n.179. 
130. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, J., concurring), rev’d,
549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
131. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517 (emphasis added). 
132. Id. at 522. 
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Because the Commonwealth “owns a substantial portion of the
state’s coastal property,” it has alleged a particularized injury in
its capacity as a landowner.133
According to the Court, despite the fact that the effects of global
warming were ubiquitous in some respects, Massachusetts experi-
enced a sufficiently unique, particularized harm. That the Court
rested its opinion on this view of the effects of global warming
suggests that Massachusetts v. EPA actually reaffirms, rather than
undermines, the geographic limitation of parens patriae. 
C. Public Nuisance as the Underlying Tort for Parens Patriae
Actions
Even if states can establish sufficient causation and show that
obesity suits do not violate the geographic limitations of parens
patriae, these states still must prove that the food industry
breached some legal duty to have a viable cause of action.134 In to-
bacco litigation, attorneys general relied upon the tort of public
nuisance as the basis of their suits.135 Tobacco litigation, however,
will likely not serve as a useful template for obesity litigation in this
regard. Courts have begun to cut back on the expansive notion of
public nuisance and now require that an actionable public nuisance
claim fit within the tort’s traditional parameters.136 The result for
obesity litigation is that public nuisance is likely too narrow of a tort
upon which to base parens patriae obesity suits, and state attorneys
general will need to find a different legal breach to justify their
intervention.137 
133. Id. (citations omitted).
134. See Schwartz et al., supra note 109, at 939 (“The United States Supreme Court has
made it clear that a claim cannot be resolved simply by reference to the general principle of
parens patriae; like everyone else, the government must state a legitimate cause of action
against a culpable party.”). 
135. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 85.
136. See infra Part II.C.2-5.
137. See infra Part III.
2013] PARENS PATRIAE 1777
1. Public Nuisance and Its Historical Background
In its original formulation, the tort of public nuisance was a basis
for government intervention to rectify harmful conduct that injured
real property or interfered with a public right.138 In the context of
public nuisance, a public right referred to the general population’s
right to uninhibited use of resources such as air, water, or public
rights of way.139 Moreover, public nuisance actions generally in-
volved “non-trespassory invasions of the public use and enjoyment
of land.”140 Such conduct included keeping sick animals, not treating
a malarial pond, storing explosives, and operating a brothel.141
Other traditional public nuisances include “blocking a public road-
way[,] ... dumping sewage into a public river or blasting a stereo
when people are picnicking in a public park.”142 Public nuisance is
a “conduct-based tort ... and has most often been used in the absence
of local ordinances prohibiting certain conduct.”143 The tort was
normally employed by the government to protect its citizens from
wantonly harmful or disruptive conduct,144 and at its most funda-
mental level, “public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with
a right common to the general public.”145 
Over time, however, public nuisance evolved into a catchall cause
of action that appeared to lack clear doctrinal boundaries.146 As one
commentator noted, public nuisance “had become an ‘impenetrable
jungle’ in which the word ‘nuisance’ had meant ‘all things to all
people, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an
138. Handler & Erway, supra note 45, at 484-85. 
139. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 455 (R.I. 2008). 
140. Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 545 (2006). 
141. See Handler & Erway, supra note 45, at 485. 
142. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 140, at 541. 
143. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Game Over? Why Recent State Supreme Court Decisions
Should End the Attempted Expansion of Public Nuisance Law, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 629, 630
(2010). 
144. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 84 (“A public nuisance is ‘conduct regarded as
so inimical to so many people’ as to warrant remedies such as abatement, injunctions, and
criminal prosecution.”). 
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
146. See Handler & Erway, supra note 45, at 485. 
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alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie.’”147 Two
scholars liken the broadening of public nuisance to a chameleon that
frequently changes to fit facts of each case in which it is invoked,148
and some argue that litigants have erroneously attempted to morph
public nuisance into an unbridled “super tort.”149
2. Public Nuisance and Tobacco Litigation 
It is possible that the attorneys general who initiated the tobacco
litigation relied upon public nuisance as the primary underlying tort
for their parens patriae actions because of its doctrinally ambiguous
limits.150 The advantage of basing such suits on public nuisance was
that it allowed the state attorneys general to bypass traditional tort
defenses, such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence.151
These defenses would normally preclude an individual plaintiff from
tort recovery.152 Under public nuisance, however, the state has no
obligation to prove that the harmed individuals misused or overused
the allegedly harmful products.153 The harmful conduct alone is suf-
ficient to have a viable claim for public nuisance.
 Because the state-initiated tobacco suits settled, the use of public
nuisance as an underlying tort for parens patriae actions was never
thoroughly tested.154 Notably, however, in one of the few state-
initiated tobacco suits that did not settle, the court rejected the
overly broad interpretation of public nuisance that had evolved over
time and reasserted the traditional doctrinal formulation of this
tort.155 The court held: 
[T]he State has not pled a proper claim [for public nuisance],
because it has failed to plead essential allegations under Texas
public nuisance law. Specifically, the State failed to plead that
147. Id. at 485 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 90, at 643-44 (W. Page Keeton et
al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)). 
148. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 140, at 541.
149. Schwartz et al., supra note 143, at 631. 
150. See Gifford, supra note 59, at 940. 
151. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 86. 
152. See Gifford, supra note 59, at 945. 
153. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 86. 
154. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
155. See Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 973 (E.D. Tex. 1997); see also
Schwartz et al., supra note 143, at 638. 
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Defendants improperly used their own property, or that the
State itself has been injured in its use or employment of its
property. The overly broad definition of the elements of public
nuisance urged by the State is simply not found in Texas case
law and the Court is unwilling to accept the state’s invitation to
expand a claim for public nuisance beyond its ground in real
property.156
Thus, Texas could not pursue a claim against the tobacco industry
based upon a public nuisance theory because the harm that Texas
was suing to vindicate did not affect real property and, therefore,
did not fit within the doctrinal limits of public nuisance.157 States
bringing obesity suits would face a similar problem. The harms
underlying such suits would not be based on harm to or arising from
real property, and in this sense would not be a traditional public
nuisance claim. 
3. Products Liability Jurisprudence and Public Nuisance 
Public nuisance has received a particularly chilly reception in
recent years in the context of products liability actions brought by
government entities.158 For example, in In re Lead Paint Litigation,
twenty-six municipalities and towns brought claims against lead
paint manufacturers to recoup medical costs they incurred in pro-
viding medical care to their citizens suffering from illnesses related
to lead paint exposure.159 The municipalities brought their claims
under a theory of public nuisance.160 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey flatly rejected their argument. The court held that allowing
such claims to proceed would “stretch the concept of public nuisance
far beyond recognition and would create a new and entirely
unbounded tort antithetical to the meaning and inherent theoretical
limitations of the tort of public nuisance.”161 
156. Am. Tobacco, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (citation omitted). 
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 494 (N.J. 2007); State v. Lead Indus.
Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 455-56 (R.I. 2008); see also Gifford, supra note 59, at 918. 
159. 924 A.2d at 486-87. 
160. Id. at 487.
161. Id. at 494; see also Gifford, supra note 59, at 918-19.
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In a similar case involving health problems deriving from lead
paint, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island likewise reaffirmed that
public nuisance claims must comport with the tort’s traditional
doctrinal parameters.162 The court emphasized that there were three
necessary elements for a viable claim of public nuisance: “(1) an
unreasonable interference; (2) with a right common to the general
public; (3) by a person or people with control over the instrumental-
ity alleged to have created the nuisance when the damage occur-
red.”163 Rhode Island’s action for recovery of lead paint-related med-
ical costs failed because such harm did not infringe on a public
right, nor did it harm real property.164 The court adhered to “the
long-standing principle that a public right is a right of the public to
shared resources such as air, water, or public rights of way.”165
Much like obesity litigation, in these lead paint cases, States inter-
vened to vindicate health-related harms caused by a private party’s
misconduct.166 As the courts’ holdings suggest, however, a private
party’s conduct that causes many people to suffer a generalized
health-related harm is not a sufficient basis for a public nuisance
claim.167 A litigant may sue under public nuisance only to vindicate
harms against traditional public rights, such as the right to free
enjoyment of air, water, and public rights of way.168
4. Environmental Jurisprudence and Public Nuisance 
Environmental harms are fertile ground for public nuisance
claims, largely because environmental claims tend to fit squarely
within public nuisance’s traditional doctrinal parameters.169
Surprisingly, however, even within the context of environmental
162. Lead Indus., 951 A.2d at 455; see also Gifford, supra note 59, at 918-19. 
163. Lead Indus., 951 A.2d. at 446.
164. Id. at 455. 
165. Id. 
166. See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 486-87 (noting that the State brought suit
against private lead paint manufacturers to assist residents suffering from lead paint
poisoning); Lead Indus., 951 A.2d at 434-35 (discussing the state’s goal to recover damages
for resident children suffering from lead poisoning as a result of paint used by the private
defendant companies).
167. See Schwartz et al., supra note 143, at 646-52.
168. See Lead Indus., 951 A.2d at 455. 
169. See Handler & Erway, supra note 45, at 485; supra notes 138-45  and accompanying
text. 
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harms, some courts have held that public nuisance is not an ade-
quate basis to redress harms related to intentional pollution.170 In
City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Electric Co., the court rejected
the plaintiff’s claim that it could sue under public nuisance, even
though the manufacturer-defendant produced harmful chemicals
that contaminated plaintiff ’s watershed.171 Only the party that
actually had control of the chemicals when they were spilled could
be sued for a claim of public nuisance.172 Likewise, in E S Robbins
Corp. v. Eastman Chemical Co., the court denied the plaintiff’s re-
quest for relief under a claim of public nuisance.173 It reasoned that,
although the defendant produced the hazardous materials that
contaminated a watershed, the defendant sold the chemicals to the
party that actually spilled them and thus was not in control of those
chemicals when the harm occurred.174 The court reiterated that “the
gravamen of a claim of public or private nuisance ... is that there
has been an intrusion which interferes with a landowner’s use of the
property”; thus a defendant not in control of the chemical at the
time of the spill could not be liable for public nuisance.175 The
plaintiff’s claim did not fit within the tort’s traditional parameters,
and as a result there could be no claim of public nuisance.176 
These environmental cases are important for two reasons. First,
they illustrate how litigants have attempted to stretch the doctrinal
limits of public nuisance to fit their particular claims.177 As the
holdings suggest, to have an actionable claim under a theory of
public nuisance, the defendant must be in control of the product
that actually causes the harm.178 This was not the case in Westing-
house or E S Robbins, and thus the plaintiffs could not rely on
170. See Handler & Erway, supra note 45, at 485. 
171. 891 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Schwartz et al., supra note 109, at 941 &
n.122. 
172. Westinghouse, 891 F.2d at 614. 
173. 912 F. Supp. 1476, 1494 (N.D. Ala. 1995); see also Handler & Erway, supra note 45,
at 485. 
174. E S Robbins, 912 F. Supp. at 1494. 
175. Id.
176. Id.; see also Handler & Erway, supra note 45, at 485. 
177. See Schwartz et al., supra note 143, at 631, 663-65. 
178. See City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir.
1989); E S Robbins, 912 F. Supp at 1494; see also Schwartz et al., supra note 143, at 633, 635-
36. 
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public nuisance.179 Second, and more importantly, these cases show
that even within the context of environmental torts, an area in
which public nuisance is generally considered a viable cause of
action,180 courts are reluctant to allow public nuisance claims that
do not fit within the torts traditional doctrinal limits.181 
5. Modern Public Nuisance and Parens Patriae Obesity    
Litigation
 The tobacco, products liability, and environmental cases suggest
that courts have reigned in the use of public nuisance in recent
years.182 Indeed, in an article analyzing several high-profile public
nuisance cases, the authors conclude that in each of these cases,
“the attempt to expand public nuisance beyond its original moorings
failed.... The rulings and legislative enactments issued to date make
clear that courts and legislatures are unwilling to redefine public
nuisance or morph it into a ‘super tort.’”183 They further add that
“[t]hese cases should signal to state attorneys general ... that public
nuisance is not a catch-all cause of action capable of circumventing
traditional tort principles and defenses.”184
Thus, state attorneys general who plan to sue the food industry
under their parens patriae power will likely be unable to rely upon
public nuisance as the underlying legal breach to justify such suits.
Obesity litigation does not derive from harmful conduct committed
against real property. Harm against real property is what public
nuisance is traditionally used to rectify,185 and the court in Ameri-
can Tobacco found the lack of such harm dispositive.186 Additionally,
the lead paint litigation made clear that states cannot sue under a
theory of public nuisance to rectify health-related harms that were
179. See Westinghouse, 891 F.2d at 614; E S Robbins, 912 F. Supp. at 1494.
180. See Handler & Erway, supra note 45, at 485. 
181. See Schwartz et al., supra note 143, at 639-40, 665. 
182. Id. at 630. 
183. Id. at 630-31. 
184. Id. at 665. 
185. Handler & Erway, supra note 45, at 484-85.
186. See Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 973 (E.D. Tex. 1997); see also
Handler & Erway, supra note 45, at 487.
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caused by a dangerous product.187 Such conduct did not infringe
upon a traditional public right like the right to air, water, and pub-
lic rights of way, and thus an action for public nuisance could not
stand.188 The same would be true for obesity litigation. Like the lead
paint cases, in obesity litigation states would intervene to recover
money they spent treating obesity-related illnesses. Such underly-
ing harm has no connection to traditional public rights. 
Finally, the environmental cases demonstrate that in order to
have a viable claim of public nuisance, the defendant must actually
be in control of the product at the time it caused the harm.189 Like
the defendants in Westinghouse and E S Robbins Corp., the defen-
dants in obesity litigation would obviously not have control over the
food products when those products harm consumers. The food
industry’s lack of such control would likely preclude an action of
public nuisance. 
If viewed in reference to only one of the three aforementioned
areas of law—tobacco, products liability, and environmental—the
argument that public nuisance would not be a viable cause of action
for state attorneys general pursuing obesity litigation may not be as
compelling. Taken together, however, it is clear that courts today
generally allow public nuisance claims only when its traditional
elements are met.190 The result for state attorneys general bringing
obesity parens patriae suits is that they must find a different com-
mon law cause of action upon which to base their suits.
Moreover, even if a suitable alternative legal theory is found, it
is unlikely to allow the attorneys general to bypass traditional tort
defenses.191 Such a conclusion is buffered by the holding in Pelman
v. McDonald’s Corp., in which the court denied the private plaintiffs’
claim that McDonald’s was responsible for their obesity-related
187. See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 494 (N.J. 2007); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n,
951 A.2d 428, 455-56 (R.I. 2008); see also Schwartz et al., supra note 109, at 944-45. 
188. See, e.g., Lead Indus., 951 A.2d at 455. 
189. See City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir.
1989); E S Robbins Corp. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 912 F. Supp. 1476, 1494 (N.D. Ala. 1995);
see also Handler & Erway, supra note 45, at 485.
190. See Handler & Erway, supra note 45, at 485 (“[Prosser] suggested that courts dismiss
nuisance claims ‘not connected with land or with any public right.’ More recently, courts have
adhered to this suggestion and ‘the scope of nuisance law appears to have returned to its more
narrow focus.’”). 
191. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 86. 
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health problems.192 The court rejected the claim because the dangers
of eating McDonald’s food were not “dangerous in any way other
than that which was open and obvious to a reasonable consumer,”
implying that the consumer had assumed the risk associated with
eating the food.193 Under public nuisance, such a defense could be
avoided because all that must be shown is that the defendant per-
formed the conduct that harmed real property or injured a public
right.194 However, the vulnerability of other tort claims to such
affirmative defenses diminishes the likelihood that attorneys gen-
eral will have standing under parens patriae in obesity litigation. 
D. Why Tobacco Litigation Settled
The fact that state attorneys general settled their suits against
the tobacco industry undermines this Note’s argument that parens
patriae standing will not be available in obesity litigation. After all,
the attorneys general who brought the tobacco litigation must have
had standing for such suits under their parens patriae authority,
otherwise the tobacco companies would not have settled in the first
place. Furthermore, tobacco litigation is not all that different from
obesity litigation.195 Both involve state-initiated suits against pri-
vate parties that produce harmful products that caused the citizens
of those intervening states to suffer health problems.196 In addition,
like the tobacco cases, state-initiated obesity litigation would be
aimed at recouping state-paid medical costs associated with treating
obesity.197 Given these similarities between obesity and tobacco
litigation, one may wonder why obesity litigation should not be ex-
pected to have an outcome similar to its tobacco counterpart. 
The first and perhaps most compelling response to such a chal-
lenge is that causation in tobacco litigation was clearly and firmly
established between the conduct of the defendants and the harms
ultimately suffered by the citizens of the intervening states. There
was little doubt that the relatively small number of defendants
192. 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 539-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
193. Id. at 541.
194. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 86. 
195. See Courtney, supra note 15, at 92-94.
196. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
197. See Pomeranz & Brownell, supra note 18, at 427. 
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involved in the tobacco litigation were directly and wholly responsi-
ble for the health problems suffered by the citizens of the interven-
ing states.198 However, there are few, if any, members of the food
industry that could be considered directly and wholly responsible for
making people obese.199 Successful parens patriae cases have always
demonstrated a clear causal link between defendant’s conduct and
the harm suffered by the intervening states’ citizens.200 State attor-
neys general bringing obesity suits likely cannot demonstrate such
a causal connection.
Second, tobacco litigation occurred during a period in which
public nuisance was still a relatively unbounded, catchall cause of
action.201 Since the tobacco litigation of the mid-1990s, however,
public nuisance has returned to its traditional doctrinal formulation
and can only be used to rectify harms against real property or other
traditional public rights.202 Because of this doctrinal reconfiguration,
obesity litigation likely cannot be based on a claim of public nui-
sance. As such, a different legal breach must be found, and what-
ever theory is pursued could be defeated by affirmative defenses
such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence.203 Because
state attorneys general in obesity litigation will not be able to
sidestep these defenses the way their tobacco counterparts did, they
will have to show that the obese citizens of their states did not
overuse or misuse the food products of the companies against which
they bring suit.204 Such a burden will likely be fatal to obesity liti-
gation.
In spite of the two key differences between obesity and tobacco
suits, what tobacco and obesity litigation have in common is that
both likely exceed the geographic scope of parens patriae. Like
obesity, smoking-related harms are not harms that citizens of the
intervening states suffer as a consequence of their citizenship in a
state.205 This being the case, one may wonder why the tobacco defen-
dants were willing to settle. The answer likely lies in the fact that
198. See supra Part II.A.2.
199. See supra Part II.A.1. 
200. See supra Part II.A.3. 
201. See Handler & Erway, supra note 45, at 487. 
202. See id. at 485.
203. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 86. 
204. See id. 
205. See supra Part II.B.1.-4. 
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the tobacco defendants did not want to rely upon such a singular
defense when there was such a strong causal link, and an unbridled
view of public nuisance gave the attorneys general wide latitude to
pursue their claims.206 Although the tobacco defendants may have
defeated the states’ claims by arguing lack of standing because of
parens patriae’s geographic limitations, the causation and underly-
ing legal breach theories asserted against them were formidable. As
this Note argues, however, this would not be the case in obesity
litigation. Attorneys general in obesity suits would have to contend
with deficient causation, curtailed public nuisance, and parens
patriae’s geographic limitations. 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO PARENS PATRIAE OBESITY LITIGATION
A. Other Attorney General Tools
If parens patriae does not, in fact, provide state attorneys general
with standing to sue the food industry for obesity related harms,
there are a variety of alternative, albeit less direct, methods to en-
force a similar regulatory regime on the food industry. First, a state
could enact stringent consumer protection laws that would give
state attorneys general broad standing to sue for breach of such
laws.207 Standard consumer protection laws give state attorneys
general authority to move for restraining orders, subpoena docu-
ments, and impose injunctions and fines against parties that breach
such laws.208 Attorneys general could also engage in rule making,
which is generally considered an appropriate method to “address a
widespread industry practice when litigation against a single entity”
will not minimize the problem.209 Attorneys general could also en-
gage in consumer education.210 Although it may be the least direct
and effective way to combat the obesity epidemic, the prominent
206. See Courtney, supra note 15, at 88-89 (“Eventually, due to potential lawsuits by
almost every state on a variety of claims, the industry settled .... While the settlement was
costly for the industry, the tobacco companies involved benefitted from the certainty and
predictability of the settlement, including being relieved of suits filed by state governments.”).
207. See Pomeranz & Brownell, supra note 18, at 427. 
208. Id.
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 428. 
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public role of state attorneys general can provide them with a bully
pulpit from which they can advocate for obesity reform.211
B. Subrogation
If litigation is the preferred method of combating the obesity
epidemic, state attorneys general also have the option of pursuing
subrogation claims.212 Generally speaking,
subrogation is the substitution of one party in place of another
with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right. It is a
derivative right, acquired by satisfaction of the loss or claim that
a third party has against another. Subrogation places the party
paying the loss or claim (the “subrogee”) in the shoes of the
person who suffered the loss (“the subrogor”). Thus, when the
doctrine of subrogation applies, the subrogee succeeds to the
legal rights and claims of the subrogor with respect to the loss
or claim.213
States bringing subrogation claims would be suing the food industry
based upon the rights and claims that obese people would be able to
assert against the food industry themselves. This is in contrast to
the parens patriae suits in which states would intervene to recoup
state-paid medical expenses tied to obesity related healthcare. 
However, in a subrogation action the subrogee effectively steps
into the place of the initial tort victim.214 As a result, subrogation
claims would be subject to traditional defenses such as assumption
of risk and contributory negligence.215 One commentator notes that
in such a tobacco subrogation suit, the state’s claim would “be
denied ... because of the smoker’s knowledge of the risks of smok-
ing.”216 Given this, in the context of obesity litigation it is likely that
such affirmative defenses would defeat subrogation claims. In addi-
tion, in lead paint subrogation cases, “the state’s claim would always
be denied in actions against lead pigment manufacturers because of
211. Id.
212. See Gifford, supra note 59, at 933. 
213. In re Hamada, 291 F.3d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 2002). 
214. Id.
215. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 42, at 86. 
216. Gifford, supra note 59, at 933-34. 
1788 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1753
the inability to identify the specific manufacturer that produced the
product causing the individual victim’s harm.”217 Like the lead paint
litigation, it would be nearly impossible to identify which partic-
ular food producer caused the subrogor’s harm in an obesity suit.
These hurdles would likely be fatal to obesity subrogation claims.
Therefore, if state attorneys general cannot sustain subrogation
claims and cannot sue the food industry under their parens patriae
authority, state-sponsored litigation is likely not the most effective
way to fight obesity. 
C. Legislation
Because the aim of parens patriae obesity suits would ultimately
be to curb the harmful practices of the food industry, such suits are
actually an attempt to implement a more comprehensive food and
nutrition regulatory regime. The implication of this is that state
attorneys general are trying to fulfill a quintessentially legislative
function.218 As one scholar has noted, “[a]s imperfect as the func-
tioning of state legislatures in reality may be, the attorney general’s
appropriate role within the constitutional framework is not to re-
place” the legislature through the exercise of his parens patriae
authority.219 The obvious conclusion is that regulation of the food
industry for the purpose of curbing the obesity epidemic is within
the province of state legislatures, not attorneys general. Exploring
legislative alternatives to state-sponsored obesity litigation is
beyond the scope of this Note; however, if, as this Note argues, state
attorneys general do not have standing under parens patriae to
bring obesity suits, legislation would likely be the most effective
alternative. 
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the assertions of some obesity reform advocates, state
attorneys general will not be able to rely upon tobacco litigation as
a model for obesity suits because these suits would fail on standing.
217. Id. at 934.
218. See id. at 969. 
219. Id.
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Unlike the tobacco litigation, the chain of causation between the
conduct of the food industry and the people who suffer from obesity
will be too attenuated to maintain standing under parens patriae.220
Moreover, allowing an action under parens patriae against various
members of the food industry would be beyond the doctrine’s
geographic limitations.221 Finally, public nuisance will not be an
adequate tort upon which to base parens patriae obesity suits, and
the alternative legal theories would likely be defeated by various
affirmative defenses.222 As such, state attorneys general likely
cannot bring obesity suits against the food industry under their
parens patriae power, and states should pursue other methods of
fighting the obesity epidemic. 
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